The Constitution Is Not Self-Enforcing
The Constitution is not self-enforcing, and the people responsible for upholding its limits have strong incentives to expand their own power instead.
James Madison (in *Federalist* No. 48) already identified the core problem: mere “parchment barriers”, mere written limits on paper, are weak against the “encroaching spirit of power.” Experience with state constitutions showed that clear textual boundaries were routinely ignored when they conflicted with majority or legislative will. The document itself has no independent force; enforcement depends on human actors (Congress, the president, courts, agencies, and ultimately the public).
Why This is the Simplest Explanation
Incentives of power-holders: Officials gain from broader authority, larger budgets, more discretion, and greater ability to deliver favored policies or client benefits. Strict adherence to enumerated powers, separation of powers, or specific amendments often constrains those goals. Courts, facing institutional limits and political pressure, have frequently under-enforced norms rather than fully policing them (a long-recognized concept in constitutional scholarship). The result is gradual expansion via interpretation, deference doctrines, and non-enforcement.
Disincentivizing Tactics
Term limits are needed for every elected official so that there are no career politicians.
Removal of perpetual payouts is key, so that no monetary benefits exist beyond the term of holding an office. This minimizes the ambition of anyone who seeks to hold an office just to enroll themself in a perpetual payout.
Completely neutral public reporting and record keeping of any politicians voting / political history should be a default tool to ensure that the general public comprehends the values of whomever is holding office.
Ratchet from crises and demand: Wars, economic emergencies, and social pressures create temporary expansions that become permanent because beneficiaries (agencies, interest groups, voters seeking programs) resist rollback. Public choice dynamics make contraction politically costly.
Insufficient counter-pressure: Checks and balances, federalism, elections, and civic virtue were meant to supply the missing force. When majorities (Republicans, Democrats) or organized minorities prefer expansive government, or when polarization and complexity reduce scrutiny, the parchment yields. Ignorance or apathy about original structure further weakens resistance.
This requires no elaborate conspiracy, no claim that the text is inherently unworkable in every respect, and no assumption of unique modern malevolence. It is consistent with the Founders’ own skepticism about paper restraints, the observed trajectory since the Progressive Era and New Deal (expanded Commerce Clause, administrative state, spending, etc.), and ordinary human and institutional behavior.
Important Caveats
“Not fully enforced” is contested. Under originalist or limited-government readings, many areas (Commerce Clause, spending, delegation, certain rights) deviate from founding-era understanding. Under living-constitutional or pragmatic approaches, the same developments are legitimate adaptations to modern conditions, with the Court and political branches “enforcing” an evolving meaning. Amendment is extremely difficult (Article V’s supermajority rules), so change has often occurred through interpretation instead.
The simplest account still holds either way: the document’s practical force tracks the incentives and political will of those who operate it, not the text alone. As Madison observed, something more than words is required, such as active structural checks plus sustained public insistence on the limits.